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feed a family is likely to attract new entrants into fisheries. Indeed, in 1996, the FAO estimated that artisanal fishing on the continent had doubled in the past decade and that most freshwater fisheries were intensively exploited (FAO, 1996).

Aquaculture has the potential to improve livelihoods and reduce the pressure on capture fisheries yet so far it has been under-exploited. Although the practice has been around since the 1850s and 1920s in South Africa and Kenya respectively, aquaculture is fairly new to many SSA countries. Unlike in other regions, aquaculture currently makes a very small contribution to total fish production; hence capture fisheries will at least in the short to medium term remain critically important in SSA. In many SSA countries, capture fisheries have ill-defined use rights. The resource is usually owned by the state but managed as a “regulated open access”, meaning fishers can harvest any quantity of fish if they comply with regulations set by central or local authorities (Akpalu, 2006). This typically results in over-exploitation.

 It has been argued that community-based resources are not generally overexploited as predicted by the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). However there may be little incentive for the community to design rules to manage the resource optimally (Ostrom, 2000). Overexploitation is also likely to occur if there is free mobility of fish stocks across communities and countries.

In some countries different ministries have enacted conflicting policies or regulatory policies that do not adequately address the of use illegal fishing technologies. For example, mesh size regulations in multispecies fisheries with small and large pelagic species are heavily violated in many fishing communities (Akpalu, 2006.) Capture fishery regulations are generally poorly enforced as a result of limited state budgets for enforcements, corrupt enforcement officers, and limited punishment for violators.

Commercial fishers who use fishing vessels compete with local fishers for inshore fish stocks, degrade habitat and interrupt the fish food chain, which often leads to conflicts and loss of property (Sterner, 2003). State institutions in Africa are generally weak and unable to cope with the activities of industrialized fleet (Fisheries Opportunities Assessment, 2006). The judicial systems in most countries are reluctant to enforce fishery regulations, which they generally consider less important.

Knowledge of fish stocks and aquatic ecosystems dynamics is important for designing sustainable fishery management policies. Nevertheless, SSA countries lack the relevant data and as a result formulate ad hoc policies to address problems of complex fishery systems. A typical example of such an ad hoc policy is the use of a uniform mesh size regulation to curtail overexploitation of a multispecies fishery that is characterized by seasonal upwellings and transboundary movement.

Although improved fisheries management has been called for, what is considered as appropriate fisheries management is highly debatable. In the past proper fisheries management has implied management for equilibrium production targets such as maximum sustainable yield, with measures to achieve these targets enforced by the state (Tweddle and Magasa, 1989; FAO, 1993). However, centralized fisheries management strategies show little evidence of actually

 

working, particularly in environments characterized by low levels of funding, low staff expertise, and poor technology.

In SSA, new management styles are being developed to achieve a range of management objectives. Many of these advocate an increased participation of communities of resource users. A good example is the GTZ initiative that examines how the management of traditional fisheries can be enhanced to increase their production (Lohmeyer, 2002). Some of the benefits of this management style are that they reduce management costs, improve monitoring of the resources, are democratic, and promise greater regulatory enforcement than do centralized, state-based management strategies. In general, the appropriate models to achieve better management will vary, as do the fisheries to which they are applied, and there is still little consensus on an appropriate model for managing Africa’s fisheries.

Policy options that are available to address stock recovery may yield results in the long term, but in the short to medium term, depending on the state of the fishery, will require restricted access. But small-scale fishers who are generally poor have immediate needs, and so even though policies
such as seasonal closure in the short-term yield increases in food availability, in the long run, fishers are usually reluctant to participate in implementing or accepting such policies (Akpalu, 2006). The provision of food subsidies to fishing communities in the very short run might be appropriate, followed by creating alternative employment opportunities and encouraging fishers to take up such opportunities in the medium term. After the fish stock recovers, the resource rent could be taxed to recover the food subsidy in the long run.

A key challenge is how to design a local- or communitybased policy instrument that can address trans-boundary capture fisheries characterized, in some cases, by unpredictable seasonal stock growths. Due to the potential resourceuse externality, any community based fishery management strategy including co-management, without inter-community collaboration, may not be accepted by fishers. Therefore, although it is important that management decisions are decentralized to communities with support from state institutions, communities must be encouraged to synchronize their institutions to minimize free-rider behavior

Aquaculture has the ability to complement wild fish production and thereby take some of the pressure off the wild stocks. SSA’s Regional Economic Communities and NEPAD have prioritized aquaculture and are leading regional efforts to direct investments, with clearly defined roles for research and capacity building.

The development of aquaculture is challenged by the costs and technology required for certain aquaculture activities such as hatcheries and grow-out ponds for fish farming. Communities are also challenged by management costs (Ngwale et al., 2004). In some cases, there have been conflicts between aquaculture activities and fishing activities near shore. For example, prawn farming projects in Rufiji and Mafia in Tanzania have met with resistance as it was feared that clearing of mangrove areas to build ponds would cause erosion that could affect seaweed farmers and fishermen (Juma, 2004).

There has been some success in aquaculture technology development based on local species, training of researchers and extension agencies, capacity support for producer