major additional revenue stream but possibly creating re­source competition between the production of food and fuel. Agriculture will become a more important source of fuel as China and India become key competitors for energy (Vanacht, 2006). It would be particularly important if feed grains (e.g., corn) were massively used for energy, as is done currently, or lose in importance. In the former case, it will become more difficult and expensive to meet a rising de­mand for meat (Ugarte et al., 2006).
     Carbon sequestration may be a new role for NAE agri­culture (Skaggs, 2001, US EPA, 2005). As China, India and other countries become more industrialized, it will become more critical to mediate levels of greenhouse gases. Plants can remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, a service that agriculture could provide. If carbon sequestration is combined with fuel production, agriculture could provide energy with little or no net gain in greenhouse gases.
     The scale and impetus for multifunctional agriculture will depend on locality and the services desired. Many ser­vices (e.g., watershed protection) are primarily beneficial to the local area; demand and support for these services will occur at state and local levels (Skaggs, 2001). The federal government will be involved with other services, such as carbon sequestration, that benefit a much larger population and area (Skaggs, 2001; US EPA, 2005).
     A number of reports discuss the implications of dualism in NA agriculture. Agriculture will consist almost entirely of very large and small farms. A relatively small number of large farms will produce most agricultural products. Small farms will survive, but operators will also depend on off-farm income; it will be important to provide the related op­portunities (Skaggs, 2001). There will be an increased trend for more public-private partnerships (Skaggs, 2001; Univ. Georgia, 2000). A more affluent society will focus private research on convenience/appeal of agricultural products and public research on product safety and environmental impacts.
     As knowledge increases, more companies, institutions and individuals will have intellectual property (IP) rights for components that are necessary to further AKST (Atkinson et al., 2003). It is important to revise the current system of IP protection and to harmonize IP security internationally. A new system is needed that will facilitate the sharing of information without eliminating the financial incentive that drives much agricultural research (Table 5-3).

5.1.2.4 Relationship of scenarios in different exercises
All the exercises reviewed have developed assumptions about a number of underlying uncertainties and future develop­ment of key driving forces and arrived at different logics regarding the construction of alternative futures. Neverthe­less, many scenarios display some similarities, and it has been argued that the enrichment of global scenarios, often through participatory processes, will define an important agenda for policy analysis, scientific research and education. This will require the enhancement of the role of ecosystems in both scenario narrative and quantification. Narratives will need to more richly reflect ecosystem descriptors, im­pacts, and feedbacks. Models will need to simulate ecosys­tem services within global assessment frameworks. (Raskin et al., 2005).

5.2 Indirect Drivers for AKST
As indicated in the conceptual framework, the AKST system does not exist in isolation. It interacts with other societal parameters of development: demography, economy, inter­national trade, sociopolitics, science, technology, education and culture. Only some elements will be highlighted here as these indirect drivers are reviewed in detail in chapter 4 of the global report, and some of them pertaining to North America and Europe have been reviewed in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this report. The predominant drivers of AKST futures are in the KST system and in agriculture.

5.2.1 Demographic drivers
Population growth is an important driver of demand for agricultural products and AKST, but the influence of AKST on population growth is very slow. Food demand is increas­ing as the world's population grows and migrates. People's requirements for food are related to three factors: quantity, quality (nutrition and safety) and cost. Since climate change, water shortages and soil degradation are rapidly changing the conditions of agricultural production, the Malthusian fears of a widening gap between people's needs and food production are once again coming to the forefront in dis­cussions on the future of the planet. The problem is most acute in the developing countries (Smil, 2000; Raoult-Wack and Bricas, 2001; Gilland, 2002; Von Braun et al., 2005). The global composition of the food demand (e.g., cereals, sugar crops, oil crops, produce, livestock and fish) will be shaped by population growth rates, economic growth, in­come levels, food safety scares and rapid urbanization in the developing economies, particularly in Asia (Cranfield et al., 1998; Collomb, 1999; Rosegrant et al., 2002; Schmidhuber, 2003; Schmidhuber and Shetty, 2005; Smil, 2005; Griffon, 2006).
     Population size and structure are determined by three fundamental demographic processes: fertility, mortality and migration. The common understanding of projections in world demography is that the growth in world population will continue up to a maximum of 7.5 to 9 billion during the second half of the 21st century, followed by a slow decrease (UN Projections).
     Between 2007 and 2050, the population of the more developed regions (Europe and North America) will remain largely unchanged at 1.2 billion inhabitants, but the popula­tion of the less developed regions is projected to rise from 5.4 billion in 2007 to 7.9 billion in 2050 and the population of the least developed countries is projected to rise from 804 million people in 2007 to 1.7 billion in 2050. Consequently, by 2050, 67% of the world population is expected to live in the less developed regions, 19% in the least developed coun­tries, and only 14% in the more developed regions (UN, 2006).
     The European Union no longer has a "demographic motor." Member States whose population is not set to fall before 2050 represent only a small share of Europe's total population. Of the five largest Member States, only Britain and France will grow between 2005 and 2050 (+8% and +9.6% population growth respectively). In some countries population figures will take a downturn before 2015, with a percentage drop of more than 10-15% by 2050 (CEC, 2005).