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tinationals in pesticide development. Unlike the situation in the information and communication technology sector, one group of companies with a consistent set of innovation strategies and the ability to sustain investment without any commercial returns over very long lead times has been able to retain a dominant position in technological innovation for agriculture for the last fifty years. This dominance of the agrochemical industry over innovation in technology for agriculture had an important influence on public attitudes to GM technology (see below). This is particularly the case in Europe, where public concerns about the conventional farming systems, which formed the main market for prod­ucts from the agrochemical industry, had been increasing steadily (Bauer and Gaskell, 2002).

Example 2: Regulation of genetically modified crops
Considering the second example of evolution of public con­trol systems in AKST, even more fundamental differences than concerning pesticides, emerged between EU and US approaches to the regulation of genetically modified (GM) crops in the 1980s. This debate was one of "product vs. process" (Tait and Levidow, 1992) with the US consider­ing GM crops as inherently similar to existing products subject to existing regulatory systems, while the EU viewed the process of genetic modification as potentially leading to novel unpredictable properties requiring a new approach to regulation. The analogy most frequently used in the EU was the introduction of alien species with the attendant risks of uncontrollable spread in the natural environment (RCEP, 1989). This distinction has been a major contributor to un­derstanding trade difficulties the US as with the EU.
     In the early stages of development of GM crop technol­ogy, the difficulty for international harmonization of Euro­pean and US regulatory systems arose at least in part from the fact that the two regions chose different and largely in­compatible analogies on which to base their regulatory sys­tems for GM crops. The European process-based approach to GM crop regulation, embodied in the Directive 90/220, was initially intended to be more precautionary than the US approach (although this notion is debated by US regula­tors) and also to be temporary, pending the generation of evidence on the safety of GM crops in use. However, the emergence in Europe of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993) campaigning very successfully against GM crops has resulted instead in a regulatory environment based on a new revised Directive 2001/18 and subsequent regulations, which are extremely restrictive and are unlikely to be compatible with a profitable European industry sector producing both GM crops and pesticides. Genetically engi­neered products under development include additional crop species and a more diverse set of traits. They will present challenges for environmental safety evaluation.
     In future development and production of GM crops for global markets is likely to be based outside Europe, particu­larly in the US and potentially also in India and China. If the co-production of GM crops and pesticides, including strate­gies for using a combination of GM crops and pesticides to give effective insect pest and disease control, becomes the dominant industry strategy, as currently seems likely, then the multinational companies that currently have a strong re­search base in Europe are likely to move their headquarters


to other parts of the world (Chataway et al., 2004; Tait and Chataway, 2006).
     In Canada, the regulatory system requires crops with novel traits to be assessed for their environmental safety ir­respective of whether they have been produced by genetic modification or conventional breeding methods (Morris, 2007). This applies for example to herbicide tolerant crops, which have been produced using either genetic modification techniques or conventional breeding. Environmental risks associated with the growing of conventionally-bred herbi­cide tolerant crops and herbicide tolerant GM crops are considered to be very similar if not identical (ACRE, 2006; Morris, 2007). In the EU conventionally bred herbicide tol­erant crops can be introduced without prior environmental risk assessment. In contrast, the EU GM directive requires that herbicide tolerant GM crops are not only assessed for potential direct risks but also indirect and management-re­lated risks. Some EU governments currently oppose certain herbicide tolerant GM crops solely because of their manage­ment-related impacts on broad-leaved weeds and associated wildlife (Hawes et al., 2003; Heard et al., 2003ab; Roy et al., 2003; Beckett, 2004; Bohan et al., 2005).
     Regulatory systems could be managed to give appro­priate signals to companies developing the technology, to improve on the potential benefits for sustainable farming systems. The earliest products of innovative technologies have usually given only a hint of potential future benefits and innovation progress relies as much on social learning as it does on scientific knowledge (Williams, 2000).

4.6.2 Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are rights awarded to indi­viduals or organizations over creative works. They give the owner the right to prevent others from making unauthor­ized use of their property for a limited period. Intellectual property is categorized as Industrial Property (functional commercial innovations) and Artistic and Literary Property (cultural creations). Development of forms of protection of agricultural IPR includes patents, gradually expanded to protect the outputs of agricultural research and innovation, plant breeders rights (PBR) and copyright (see Chapter 2). A unique hybrid system of PBRs has evolved that provides a specialized form of IP protection and offers an alternative to the patent system (CIPR, 2002). The International Con­vention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (the UPOV Convention), which was adopted in Paris in 1961 and entered into force in 1968, has provided the basis for international harmonization in this regard (Box 4-4).
     There are, however, unresolved issues associated with the development of IPR frameworks at international and national scales, as none of the systems (patents, trademarks, contracts, GI, varieties) offer much protection of rights of farmers and local communities, especially in developing countries. Many NGOs and farmers' organizations are cur­rently active to develop effective protection mechanisms based on traceability and transparency (Bazile, 2006). For a thorough analysis and assessment of roles, impacts and challenges of IPR protection, see IAASTD Global report, Chapters 2 (2.3.1 Genetic resources management) and 3 (3.2.4 Relationships between AKST and coordination and regulatory processes among multiple stakeholders).