proaches, requirements for elaborate documentation and justification of research (Schultz, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985; Huffman and Just, 2000). An asymmetry exists in the shar­ing of transactions costs associated with external peer-re­viewed competitive grant programs, especially when the average grant size is small and the average award rate is low (Huffman, 2005).
     Other topics discussed as a response to the dominant developments included the character of agricultural research as innovation and the difference between setting efficient in­centives and organizational structures for industrial produc­tion/marketing and for innovation processes (Schultz, 1980; Anderson and Hardaker, 1992; Huffman and Just, 2000).
     Competitive grants are by many scientists seen as leading to an increase in scientific quality. They have in some cases also been successfully used to lever a change or paradigm shift in organizational behavior (Sutherland et al., 2004). The main intentions of the shift towards more competition were to ensure high quality science, high overall productiv­ity and transparency. However, the shift has also had other fundamental consequences. The increase of managed com­petition in public funding has substantially contributed to prioritization according to the interests of funding agencies which may reflect interests of governmental policies, com­mercial  interests  (farming community,  large  companies, etc.), NGOs and other stakeholders who are represented on the boards responsible for project evaluation and resource allocation (see also 4.4.5). Because of the changing objec­tives and priority fields of the financiers and varied sources, the opportunity for specialization and competence building for experts and facilities has been reduced in areas of agri­cultural R&D where there is no sustained funding, even if there are high pay-off potentials (not necessarily economic profits).
     The trend towards more short-term contracts (usually limited to three years or less) has improved accountability (Nickel, 1997) but has had a number of negative impacts for AKST. Research has been increasingly directed towards laboratory work rather than the field. There has been less opportunity for empirical studies on sustainable agrifood systems with their inherent long-term perspective. It has been hypothesized that this may partly explain the shift in the focus of life sciences towards research into biotechnol­ogy (Buhler et al., 2002). The drive to short-term funding has also resulted in a reduction in NAE scientists with over­seas experience in agriculture.
     Based on principal-agent theory, the move from for­mula/program funding to research grant funding may be partly counterproductive for agricultural research due to too much of the best scientists' time being used for proposal writing/evaluation and signaling activities, the risks of con­ducting research being imposed unduly on scientists, and review committees not sufficiently sampling diversity (Huff­man and Just, 2000). There is also concern about the associ­ated increase in bureaucratization of science. An asymmetry exists in the sharing of transactions costs associated with ex­ternal peer-reviewed competitive grant programs, especially when the average grant size is small and the average award rate is low (Huffman, 2005). Others note that, in the United States, competitive grants have never reached more than about 15% of total USD A research funding to States, nor

more than 17% of total public agricultural research expen­ditures (Rubenstein et al., 2003; Rubenstein et al., 2007). Rubenstein et al. (2003) showed empirically that the US competitive grants focused more on basic research and were distributed among fewer states than other instruments.
     Along with the declining program/formula funding of research institutions, recent trends foster more competition for budget funding, application of the short-term project formula, reduction of funds for technical research staff and more direct management of expenditures. In the principal-agent model for agricultural research incentives, these policy changes resulted in an immediate increase in the institutional risks of research (Huffman and Just, 2000). The short-term benefits of these shifts may not outweigh the longer-term costs and agricultural research organizations may not be able to retain important expertise (Alston et al.,  1998). Block allocations on the basis of reviews conducted at lon­ger time intervals may be a way of reducing the transaction costs while still preserving a certain level of competition.
     Education as well as managed competition, peer-review in project evaluation and priority setting by scientific jour­nals have all played a significant role in strengthening the disciplinary paradigms and increasing method-orientation in science. Use of the most advanced, disciplinarily appreci­ated methods has become a crucial precondition for fund­ing, journal publications and career development, often overruling the strategic objectives and practical relevance of the work. These changes had significant consequences for international AKST. For example, development as a field within economics may be disappearing due to "the path-dependent and disequilibrium nature" being at odds with the mathematical directions of the present-day economic theory (Falcon and Naylor, 2005).

Privatization
Already in the early 1970s the public agricultural research system in the US was criticized (by J. Hightower and col­leagues) for benefiting the large farmers more than small farmers and for providing particular benefits to agribusi­nesses (Buttel, 2005). The rise in the role of the private sector  (including the  farming industry)  in public R&D management in the last 15 years, which occurred through increased linking of private and public funds through levy schemes, joined funds and by inviting representatives of in­dustry to join prioritizing committees and the increase in the share of private funding in the overall funding of ag­ricultural R&D has aggravated these concerns (see 4.6). The share of private sector expenditure in total agricultural R&D has increased to the extent that it exceeds public sector expenditures (4.5.3) (Fuglie et al., 1996; Huffman and Evenson, 1993; Huffman and Just, 1998). This trend is seen by many as not benefiting society as it is seen as shifting the focus further away from R&D that could ben­efit resource-poor communities and small rural enterprises, reduce hunger and poverty and improve equity and social sustainability (BANR, 2002; Buhler et al., 2002). The in­creased privatization of agricultural research has generated a new stream of agricultural research activism, including the anti-biotechnology movement which in parts contests cor­porate R&D on genetically modified crops (Buttel, 2005). The legislation introduced in the 1980s enabled universi-