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AKST Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evolution, Effectiveness and Impact | 85

          In order to overcome these problems, a variety of semiautonomous institutions have been established, based on the assumption that they would be free from political influence in such fields as hiring and would enjoy greater flexibility in such areas as their administrative regulations.

          Often, however, the institutional changes proposed could not be implemented, o were only done so partially. When examining the reasons, one or more of these factors seem to have played a role: (1) the Ministry of Agriculture or its equivalent agency would not renounce control of the AKST body; (2) the new human resource policies were not all that different from those applied in Ministry departments; (3) administrative procedures and financial controls remained too complex.

          Human resource issues cannot be attributed to the quality of researchers, who are often cited as among the most capable and productive scientists in the field, but rather to the working atmosphere and the resources available to those centers. It should also be noted that simply improving salaries to attract and retain competent personnel does not automatically increase productivity nor the quality of research unless, at the same time, more attention is paid to the processes whereby staff is hired, evaluated, and provided with incentives.

          Sometimes, particularly in traditional government systems, annual salary increases and promotions are based on seniority, not on productivity. The reason such systems were adopted was to discourage “favoritism.” This is undoubtedly a consideration. However, it has become a crutch for a majority of the personnel of these institutions, aggravated in some countries by the existence of labor laws that make it almost impossible to sanction or fire unproductive employees. Productivity is thus rarely valued or rewarded, a severe weakness of some national institutions that, unless corrected, will condemn them to mediocrity.

          In addition, LAC’s oldest publicly funded research institutions such as EMBRAPA, INTA, INIA and INIFAP of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico respectively are faced with a problem of ageing researchers and support staff. Few of these institutions have adopted plans to renew or replace human resources due for retirement. In some countries, such as Mexico, this has resulted from a government policy of “indiscriminately downsizing the state apparatus”—an issue that merits critical assessment with a view to designing rational, efficient and effective policies.

          Few AKST institutions have programs for training their scientific and technical staff and keeping them up to speed on current developments in their field, nor do they offer incentives to attract talented young people into cutting-edge research in new, highly promising fields like biotechnology or nanotechnology. Even less attention has been paid to other fields of knowledge—economic, social, anthropological— that are not so new or popular, but are very valuable when it comes to explaining and encouraging individual and collective attitudes and actions in order to generate and implement innovations leading to productive, sustainable and equitable development.

          The abovementioned challenges justify efforts to promote a greater and more effective interaction between research centers and advanced training and education institutions, and to promote their participation in projects of

 

interest to their respective countries and societies involving what is known as Participatory Innovation Development.

          In the administrative field, it is clear that senior managers of AKST institutions feel more comfortable with bureaucratic procedures than with more flexible systems for administering financial resources and purchasing inputs, since the former protect them from being accused of mismanagement. Safeguards or controls are necessary to prevent abuses, but it is also essential to adopt more flexible and effective administration and financing systems. This is particularly crucial in AKST system institutions, where significant delays in making funds available, or in purchasing equipment and inputs, can negatively affect the effectiveness of research.

          However, either because of the nature of their legal constitutions or because of subsequent administrative decisions by the Central Government, most NARIs have operated within the administrative restrictions and political interference that characterize Latin America’s public sector (Bisang, 2003).

          Piñeiro, (2003) cites Argentina’s National Agricultural Technology Institute (INTA) as an example of the progressive erosion of their autonomy (Piñeiro et al., 2003). Created in 1958, INTA’s charter granted it financial and administrative autarchy. However, over the years, the political authorities gradually curtailed this independence, converting it de facto into an institution with the same restrictions as the rest of the central administration. (Recently, this situation was reversed when INTA recovered its budgetary autonomy.)

          A similar situation occurred with Mexico’s National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI), which was widely recognized for its effectiveness, efficiency and productivity. Legally, it was a deconcentrated body of the central administration; from the beginning it was endowed with a trust fund that allowed for flexible and timely financing and operational autonomy. This mechanism was canceled in 1982, as part of a general government instruction to cancel public trust funds, and thereafter the Institute became subject to the regulations of the central administration, which were not very suitable to research functions. However, national public research centers like INIFAP currently enjoy a trust fund that contributes to the flexible and timely financing of their research activities.

          At present, the effectiveness and relevance of AKST system institutions is in doubt. The lack of consistent political support, the ensuing weakness and randomness of public funding, and institutional “obsolescence” in the face of the growing complexity of science and extraordinary changes in the economic context, all call for AKST institutions in LAC countries to embrace modernization (Piñeiro and Trigo, 1983), including modifications to their management processes and their links with users.

          To be more efficient and effective, changes to AKST system institutions must be approved, implemented, and audited. External political pressures must ensure that these changes are approved by higher-level government authorities. That will not be easy. This external political pressure may be exerted more naturally and efficiently by society through the social oversight of stakeholders, who will ensure that AKST institutions implement the approved changes. In other words, the advancement of AKST systems in LAC de