Outlook on Agricultural Changes and Its Drivers | 269

food systems and AKST. Hence, it will be necessary to work with different assumptions when formulating scenarios.

     For Asia, the political commitment to the agricultural sector is projected to continue as indicated by a relatively high budget share to this sector. In Africa, one can also ob­serve an increased emphasis on agriculture; e.g., one indica­tion is the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, led by the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. African Heads of State, in their Maputo Declara­tion, made a commitment to allocate at least 10% of their national budgetary resources to agricultural development (African Union, 2003). This goal is also supported by the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), which is high on the agenda of the New Partner­ship for Africa's Development (NEPAD). However, it still remains to be seen whether these commitments will indeed translate into increased investment on agriculture in Af­rica. In formulating scenarios, one also has to take into ac­count regional and global trade agreements, which limit the choices that countries can make regarding their agricultural policies (see 4.2.1).

4.3.3.3 State capacity for policy implementation
To assess the impact of public policies on the development of AKST, it is necessary to consider government effective­ness, e.g., the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence and independence of the civil service, and the credibility of the government's commitment to its policies. Control of cor­ruption is also important for the effective implementation of agricultural policies, especially in agricultural infrastructure provision, such as irrigation. Since agricultural develop­ment depends on the ability of the state to overcome market failures, which are prevalent especially in early phases of agricultural development (Dorward et al., 2004), changes in state capacity are an important sociopolitical driver. Gov­ernance problems tend to be greater in low-income coun­tries; they are particularly prevalent in the Central African region, in spite of some recent improvements (Kaufmann et al., 2006). The state capacity for policy implementation can be improved by governance reforms, including public sector management reforms, the use of e-government, outsourcing and public-private partnerships, all of which are important in the agricultural sector. Improving state capacity is a long-term process, however, lasting often for several decades be­fore a real impact can be achieved (Levi, 2004). Hence, for short- and medium-term scenarios, it will be useful to take into account the current variation in state capacity, as mea­sured by governance indicator data sets (Kaufmann et al., 2006).

4.3.3.4 Social factors that shape the future of agriculture
The social factors that shape the future of agriculture in­clude conflicts, changes in social values and social structure (related to social stratification, gender roles and ethnicity). In view of the complexity and country specificity of social factors, it is difficult to identify general global trends that can be used to formulate scenarios. There are, however, some projections on global trends; e.g., economic develop­ment gives rise to cultural changes that make individual au­tonomy, gender equality and democracy increasingly likely (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

 

     These findings correspond to the "End of History." In this view, liberal democracy and Western values comprise the only alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world (Fukuyama, 1993). This view forms the basis of several sce­narios in global assessments such as the A1b scenario in IPCC's SRES scenarios and (to some degree) the Global Or­chestration scenario (MA). This view has been challenged by the controversial "Clash of Civilizations" theory (Hunting-ton, 1996); i.e., that people's cultural and religious identity rather than political ideologies or economic factors will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world, especially between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. Again, this view forms the basis of several scenarios (A2 in IPCC SRES; Order from Strength in MA). It should be noted, however, there is no evidence for an increase in the frequency of intercivilizational conflicts in the post-Cold War period (e.g., Tusicisny, 2004). With regard to agricultural development, in­ternal conflicts and civil wars matter as much, or even more, than international conflicts. The number of wars reached a peak of 187 in the mid-1980s, but was reduced by half in 2000 (Marshall et al., 2003). Most of these wars were internal conflicts, and most of them occurred in poor countries.

     Instability can be defined as the incidence of revolution­ary and ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, genocides or politicides (government targeting of specific communal or political groups for destruction) (Goldstone et al., 2005). The percentage of countries experiencing periods of instabil­ity reached a peak of almost 30% in the early 1990s (Figure 4-9). A predictive model with four variables (regime type, infant mortality, a "bad neighborhood" indicator—four or more bordering states in armed civil or ethnic conflict—and the presence or absence of state-led discrimination) showed that ethnically factionalized nascent democracies, without fully open access to political office and without institution­alized political competition, are particularly prone to wars and conflicts, even with favorable  economic conditions (Goldstone et al., 2005).

     The implications of wars and armed conflicts for agricul­tural development are far-reaching: crop and livestock produc­tion are reduced or abandoned due to insecurity, lack of labor, environmental degradation and destruction of infrastructure. Wars and conflicts may affect AKST in different ways, for ex­ample, by reducing the availability of public funds for agricul­tural research and extension, and by a loss of local knowledge due to displacement of agricultural producers.

     Another important social factor shaping the future of agriculture is the capacity of communities and societies to cooperate, also referred to as social capital (see, e.g., Put­nam, 1993). In agriculture, especially in small-scale agri­culture, producer organizations play an important role in addressing market failures while avoiding government fail­ures. They provide political voice to agricultural producers, help them to hold government organizations accountable, and engage in the provision of agricultural services. Their role has been increasing in recent years due to investments in their capacity and conducive factors such as democratiza­tion (Rondot and Collion, 2001).

4.3.3.5 Regional and global collaboration
The future of AKST will also depend on the development of regional and global political organizations; e.g., regional