sharing mechanisms for cumulative innovations (Harilal, 2006).
     Meanwhile, many representatives of indigenous commu­nities are advocating rejection of the application of an IPRs system based on their worldviews. In June 1999, a group of 114 indigenous peoples' organizations from many countries around the world, as well as another 68 indigenous peoples' support groups, issued a joint indigenous peoples' statement on the TRIPS agreement  (Tebtebba Foundation,  1999). Some of the key points of the statement are as follows:
I.     Nobody can own what exists in nature except nature herself . . . Humankind is part of Mother Nature, we have created nothing and so we can in no way claim to be owners of what does not belong to us ... [W]estern legal property regimes have been imposed on us, con­tradicting our own cosmologies and values. II.   We view with regret and anxiety how Article 27.3b of the   Trade-Related   Aspects   of Intellectual  Prop­erty Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements will further denigrate and under­mine our rights to our cultural and intellectual heritage, our plant, animal and even human genetic resources and discriminate against our indigenous ways of think­ing and behaving.

The indigenous peoples' representatives are of the view that the IPRs regime threatens the rights, way of life and knowl­edge of indigenous peoples. They also reject the application of an IPRs system of indigenous peoples which is based on collective innovation and collective rights. Thus they are ad­vocating that the international agreements need to modify to include diverse worldviews. This was also presented in a statement on behalf of indigenous peoples at a roundtable on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in No­vember 1999. According to the statement: "We believe that the challenge for WIPO and governments, as well as other international multilateral organizations, is to maintain an open mind and be more daring in exploring ways and means to protect and promote indigenous and traditional knowl­edge outside of the dominant IPR regimes. WIPO should not insist in imposing that the IPR regime it is implement­ing, particularly patents, is what should be used to protect traditional knowledge. Other forms of protection should be explored and developed in partnership with indigenous peoples and other traditional knowledge holders. Any effort to negotiate a multilateral framework to protect indigenous and traditional knowledge should consider indigenous prac­tices and customary laws used to protect and nurture indig­enous knowledge in the local, national and regional levels." (Tauli-Corpuz, 1999)

3.3.6     National and regional responses, impact on developing countries
There is a trend for bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between developing and developed countries (especially the United States) to oblige the countries concerned to allow for the patenting of plants and animals and this is often under pressure from the developed countries.
     In the case of new plant varieties, there are pressures for

developing countries to adopt the 1991 International Con­vention on the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV) as the "sui generis" system, but this is more like a patent and favors commercial plant breeders at the cost of small farmers and even public researchers. Malaysia and Thailand have adopted sui generis plant variety protection laws that strike a better balance for small farmers, but in ongoing ne­gotiations of bilateral FTAs with the United States, they are pressured to take on UPOV 1991. China became a Mem­ber of UPOV 1991 on 23 April, 1999. As a WTO Member, China also has TRIPS obligations and the challenge is to ensure that the flexibilities and safeguards are maximized so that the public interest and long-term sustainable develop­ment of the country are assured.
     The shortcomings and inherent inequities in existing in­tellectual property systems, especially patents, are increas­ingly acknowledged. A comprehensive assessment and the net adverse impact of IPRs on developing countries can be found in the report of the International Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, entitled "Integrating Intel­lectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (2002). This Commission was initiated by the UK government and chaired by a leading US lawyer, Professor John Barton. Lit­erature  survey,  commissioned papers, consultations  and country visits were undertaken to "incorporate voices from both developed and developing countries: from science, law, ethics and economics and from industry, government and academia" [for a full report, see www.iprcommission.org].
     The obligations on developing countries to implement TRIPS are estimated to result in increased payments by them of US$60 billion a year (Finger, 2002). The net annual in­crease in patent rents resulting from TRIPS for the top six developed countries in this field are estimated to be US$41 billion—with the top beneficiaries being the US with $19 bil­lion, Germany $6.8 billion, Japan $5.7 billion, France $3.3 billion, UK $3 billion and Switzerland $2 billion (World Bank, 2002). Developing countries that will incur major an­nual net losses include South Korea ($15.3 billion), China ($5.1 billion), Mexico ($2.6 billion), India ($903 million) and Brazil ($530 million).
     The World Bank's patents rents estimates, already high enough, significantly understate the actual costs to devel­oping countries, as these only measure the direct outflow of patent rents from these countries (Weisbrot and Baker, 2002). In addition there are economic distortions as the IP protection causes goods to sell at prices far above their mar­ginal costs, thus given rise to "dead-weight cost". Citing other studies, they estimate the deadweight costs to be twice the size of the estimated patent rents.
      In addition, there are costs for administering and enforc­ing IP laws and policies, requiring law reform, enforcement agencies and legal expertise. World Bank project experience indicates that it will cost a developing country $150 million to get up to speed on three new WTO areas (IPRs, SPS and customs valuation) (Finger, 2002); this amount is more than a full year's development budget in many LDCs.
      Compared with the outcome of the market access nego­tiations, the TRIPS amounts (i.e., net rents) are big money (Finger, 2002). The US obtained 13 times more benefit from annual patent rents arising from TRIPS than from