gies (so-called "enabling technologies") and plant materials among many companies and institutions also created FTO problems. Biotechnology companies have dealt with these problems by developing their home-grown technology, li­censing technology from other companies and by acquiring or merging with other companies, and thus assembling a complete IP portfolio allowing them to commercialize new technologies, including transgenic cultivars of major field crops such as maize, soybean and cotton. Left out of this equation are many horticultural crops or specialty crops with smaller markets in developed countries and subsistence crops in developing countries.
     A recent initiative from some leading public universities and private foundations promises to address the FTO issue. The Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource for Agri­culture (PIPRA; www.pipra.org) intends to establish "best practices" encouraging the greatest commercial application of publicly funded research, while also retaining rights to al­low public institutions to fulfill their responsibilities toward the public at large. It will also establish a database provid­ing an overview of IPR currently held by public institutions, with up-to-date information on the licensing status of these IPRs. In addition, it will also attempt to pool patents or other IPRs to develop "technology packages" of comple­mentary patents, which would provide FTO to public sector researchers and reduce transaction costs associated with ob­taining licenses to develop transgenic cultivars (Atkinson et al., 2003). While actions such as those proposed by PIPRA attempt to address the FTO issues, they do not fundamen­tally alter the framework in which current public research has come to operate. The public-sector research "culture" has a long tradition of open sharing of genetic resources, germplasm and research findings. This has led, among other things, to extensive genetic resources collections with broad availability. This tradition of open sharing and exchange is now severely challenged and raises several concerns with regard to the availability of biodiversity for research and cultivar development.
     In response to bioprospecting by corporations, the gene banks of the centers belonging to the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), such as the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (CIMMYT; Mexico), the International Rice Research Insti­tute (IRRI; The Philippines) and the Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT; Colombia), which hold more than 500,000 germ plasm accessions, have instituted an MTA (http://www.sgrp.cgiar.org/MTA_E.pdf). This MTA seeks to protect the germ plasm or breeding lines and as­sociated information distributed by the CGIAR center from ownership or IP claims by the recipients of this material. Obviously, this MTA does not cover further breeding uses leading to improved materials. It is noteworthy that most of the germ plasma in these gene banks were donated by Southern countries and has been and continues to be acces­sible on an open access basis. Yet the genes and improved varieties derived from such material (usually developed by Northern corporations or agents) often enjoy proprietary protection under the current IPR regime. In the growing en­closure of genes and biodiversity, the developing countries are getting the raw deal.

3.3.4     Technology dissemination and transfer
A strong IPR system is normally advocated to stimulate in­novation. However, for most developing countries, the ex­tra innovations generated by stronger PIPRs (private IPRs) would be meager, as agents in these countries possess poor innovative capabilities according to IPR criteria. As even Primo Braga (1996), who is quite sympathetic to TRIPS, admits, there is little evidence that stronger PIPRs encour­age greater R&D in developing countries. Thus, one of the main concerns of developing countries with the adoption of the TRIPS agreement has been the extent to which the new rules will affect the transfer of technology, a vital ele­ment to foster economic development. As 97% of world patents are held by developed countries (UNDP,  1999), the cost from paying royalties may significantly outweigh the benefits from (the insignificant) additional knowledge that  the  system  extracts  from  nationals  of  developing countries.
     It has been argued that higher standards of IP can lead to transfer of technology, as foreign corporations would be encouraged to invest in developing countries and make use of their technologies. However, there is also a counter-argu­ment that foreign firms that have obtained patents in devel­oping countries are able to make inroads and profits in these countries without having to produce the patented products there, as they can import the products and sell them at mo­nopoly prices.
     There are several ways in which a strong IPR regime can hinder access of developing countries to technology (see Khor, 2002). Obstacles to technology transfer make it difficult for developing countries and their corporations to upgrade productivity which is necessary for them to com­pete successfully. They thus impede competition. Firstly, a strict IPR regime can discourage research and innovation by locals in a developing country. Where most patents in the country are held by foreign inventors or corporations, lo­cal R&D can be stifled since the monopoly rights conferred by patents could restrict the research by local researchers. Strict IPR protection, by its apparent bias, may actually slow the pace of innovation in developing countries and in­crease the knowledge gap between industrial and developing countries. In such situations, the IPR system favors those who are producers of proprietary knowledge, vesting them with greater bargaining powers over the users (Oh, 2000). The UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights also provides analysis and examples of how the patent system might inhibit research and innovation (CIPR, 2002). Sec­ondly, a strict IPR regime makes it difficult for local firms or individual researchers from developing or making use of patented technology. Thirdly should a local firm wish to "legally" make use of patented technology, it would usu­ally have to pay significant amounts in royalty or license fees. As pointed out earlier, TRIPS increases the leverage of technology-suppliers to charge a higher price for their technology. Many firms in developing countries may not af­ford the cost. Even if they could, the additional high cost could make their products unviable. Moreover, there could be a large drain on a developing country's foreign exchange from having to pay foreign IPR holders for the use of their technology. Many developing countries with serious debt