What this shows is that commercialization and inten­sification of production need not necessarily lead to mon­oculture plantations. Under what conditions will one or the other occur? This needs further investigation and analysis. But a few preliminary points can be made. Where there is a known synergy between different components of the agro ecosystem, for instance bay leaf trees and hill broom grass and both or all components have commercial value, then farmers are likely to take up the simultaneous cultivation of more than one plant/tree.
     Further, where the farmers undertaking the commercial production are locally resident farmers and not distant cor­porations, then the farmers are also likely to respond to the use values of other components of the agro ecosystem that do not have commercial value, but can be of various uses to the farmers. On the other hand, distant corporations, concerned with their commercial profits will see these other plants or trees as weeds and seek the single-minded maximization of production of the commercial crop in which they are inter­ested. While farmers would have a multi-valued function, including even use values in their assessment, corporations have a single-valued function, based on the maximization of the commercial income from what they sell.
     The introduction of diversity into the shade serves a very important economic function—that of protecting against the risk inherent in commercial systems of production. In the mid-1990s prices of tobacco collapsed and in the early 2000s it is coffee prices that have collapsed. What this shows is that monoculture commercialization carries serious risks. Particularly where the crops require large external inputs, as is the case with tobacco compared to coffee, there is a dan­ger of falling into serious debt when prices collapse. A mix of commercial crops needs to be promoted so that farmers are protected against excessive risks in any one market.
     At the same time the limits of such self-insurance, as it were, should be noted: it is costly. It is estimated that the loss of income due to choosing a mixed cropping pattern may be as much as 10 to 15% in India (Kabeer, 2005). This prob­ably holds for crops between which there is no synergy. But for insurance, a better method is to pool risks, something that requires well developed insurance and financial systems. This is something that countries like China or India, with large commodity markets might be and are able to carry out. But for smaller countries, a regional approach might be needed. Of course, there will be issues of power and domi­nation within such regional arrangements, issues that are probably better negotiated in regional forums, rather than on a one-to-one basis. And, as the volume of production in a country grows, it might set up its own forward trading and insurance arrangements.
     Even these market-based instruments for dealing with fluctuations in commodity prices have their limits. They need to be well-funded. More important there is an important contradiction—if they work, the resultant subsidies may not bring about the needed changes in the structure of produc­tion, in particular the reduction in output of those prod­ucts that are over-supplied, or, if they do bring about such a change, there is an enormous social cost that accompanies the change. The market method of bringing about a change in production is through the destruction of livelihoods of those in such sectors. The numerous suicides of farmers in

different parts of India are testimony to the social violence of pure market-based transformations. The challenge is to fashion ways of bringing about change in structures of pro­duction that do not carry such social violence. The Group of Eminent Persons (UNCTAD, 2003) proposed the formation of a fund to promote diversification of production by com­modity producers and also the search for and promotion of new uses of products.

3.3      Trade Agreements, Intellectual Property Rights and AKST
IP (intellectual property) is driven by technology and busi­ness tactics. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are not natu­ral rights but rather privileges granted to inventors to re­ward them for inventions. There are many types of IPRs like patents, trademarks, plant breeders' rights and copyrights. Patents in agriculture are important for promoting agricul­tural research and development (Alam, 2004). This confer­ment of the privilege of monopoly is supposed to be an in­centive for innovation and to enable recovery of cost. Any IPRs system has to balance the privilege given to inventors and corporations owning the IPRs with the public interest. The public interest includes consumer welfare, the right of other producers to use technology, the right to develop, sus-tainability and environmental protection.

3.3.1      The TRIPS agreement and other IPR regimes

WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The Trade-Related Aspects of In­tellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was established as part of the WTO in 1995. The TRIPS agreement has resulted in a very significant shift in the balance in the IPRs regime away from the public interest towards the monopolistic privileges of IPRs holders. Since TRIPS is a legally binding international framework enforceable in the WTO through the threat of trade sanctions, it has been able to effectively disseminate a model of IPRs regime throughout the world to its over 130 member states. TRIPS has therefore instituted a basically "one-size-fits-all" system of IPRs, where similar standards are set for countries of differing levels of devel­opment. It is in the developing countries where the unsuit-ability and effects of the inappropriate provisions are most adversely and acutely felt.
     Before TRIPS, where patent law existed, most countries provided for "process" patents but not product patents. So different people could use different processes to produce the same product and that allows many products to enter the market and consumers can have competitively priced prod­ucts. Research and innovation was also encouraged and a good example was pharmaceutical products.
     Most developing countries, before TRIPS, did not allow patents on food and medicines even if they had patent laws in operation. Patents on biological resources were also not al­lowed in almost all countries. Countries were free to choose the scope of patents, the term of patent protection (usually from 5 to 15 years depending on the national laws) and other safeguards to meet their socioeconomic objectives.
     Developed countries in their developing stages did not allow patenting and other IPRs or had very narrow scope of IP protection. Many of them also discriminated between