duty in January, 1993. The index of such anti-dumping ini­tiations was 1875 per dollar of imports for India compared with only 100 for the USA.
     India also faced very costly anti-dumping actions for its exports: 779 per dollar of exports in terms of index, com­pared with only 100 for the USA (Mattoo and Subramanian, 2000). In 1998 alone, India faced one case of anti-dumping for every $2.74 billion of exports as against only 15 such cases faced by the US for every $45.46 billion of exports. India was next only to Ukraine in this regard. In fact, more than 15% of all final measures imposed under anti-dump­ing investigations were aimed at India (Bhattacharyya and Gupta, 2001).
     Over the period 1980-2001, 113 countries were targets of anti-dumping investigations and during the recent period of 1995-2001 alone, 93 countries faced anti-dumping inves­tigations with prominent ones being from Asia i.e., China, South Korea, Japan and Thailand which together accounted for 30% of all cases. In fact, China has faced about 15% of all (2416) anti-dumping cases filed by the WTO members up to the end of 2003. Due to this, China has recently set up an early warning system on 189 goods of export importance mainly including textiles, home appliances, steel and furni­ture which account for 60% of China's exports to the USA (Joseph, 2004). India's share in all anti-dumping actions suf­fered went up from 0.9% in the 1980s (1981-87) to 3.72% by the late 1990s (1995-2001) (Zanardi, 2004). Also, it is increasingly the developing world countries which are targeting more of other developing world countries (50% cases) besides the developed countries targeting developing countries. But, most of the cases in Japan, South Korea and the EU have been settled with price undertakings as the Jap­anese avoid courts and litigation by tradition. On the other hand, India had all its anti-dumping investigations settled through anti-dumping duties only (Zanardi, 2004).
     The USA imposed anti-dumping duty on Indian pre­served mushrooms along with those from China and In­donesia in 1999. The dumping margin calculated for India was the highest (243%), followed by China (198%) and Indonesia (22%). The USA imposed company specific anti­dumping duties on Indian firms which ranged from 7-243 % though the effective rates were ranging from 7% to 15% as other firms were not exporting any more (The Economic Times, March 1, 1999). The EU investigated 28 exporters from India, the highest number followed by China (24) and South Korea (20) during 1998-2002 mainly in iron and steel, chemicals and textiles. On the other hand, the EU suf­fered most from USA and India in 2002 with 25% of the cases each by the two countries (Silberston, 2003).
     There is also significant evidence of retaliation in anti­dumping actions. Twelve countries simultaneously targeted to protect the same industry group wherein same product was subject to anti-dumping duty both at home and abroad. It is difficult to accept the fact that an industry that is injured by imports from a country can be causing injury to the very same industry in another country (Bhatt, 2003).

Decisions of the WTO panels on anti-dumping measures. The working of the WTO panels on anti-dumping so far has shown that it is able to build confidence in the dispute settle-

ment mechanism of the body. This is evident in the case of US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 where the WTO panel and the Appellate Body have unequivocally held that the US Act, which provides for specific action against dumping in the form of civil and criminal proceedings and penalties, is in­consistent with the WTO agreement on anti-dumping (Sat-apathy, 2000a). Similarly, the WTO panel ruling on India's complaint against anti-dumping measures by the EC on im­ports of bed linen from India, in favor of India, suggests that WTO panels cannot be manipulated. In particular, the measures of anti-dumping by the EU were rejected. The EU is one of the four major traditional users of these measures along with the US, Canada and Australia and has a long experience and administrative and legal setup. Secondly, the panel has ruled against the EU practice of zeroing negative price differences in the calculation of dumping margins. This finding of the panel against the zeroing practice would now force the prevailing practice in some of the developed countries to change. This will mean that in many cases, the dumping margins may disappear or come down below the de minimis level for the developing country exporters, re­quiring no anti-dumping duties (Satapathy, 2000b).
     Further, the EU did not even collect data for examin­ing the effect of all economic factors on an industry which led the WTO panel to reject the EU's claim on injury to the industry because of dumping of imports. This means that in all the countries, much more economic analysis to determine injury to industry and to attribute it to dumping will be required. The panel even questioned the sample used for de­termining injury for the domestic producers as the EU found domestic industry to consist of 35 producers but used data on other and lesser number (17) of producers. The panel also argued that before imposing anti-dumping duties, pos­sibilities of constructive remedies should be explored by the developed countries. The EU had rejected India's request to offer price undertakings and by doing so, EU had failed in its obligation to explore constructive remedies to the problem of dumping as provided in the Agreement on Anti-Dumping Measures (Satapathy, 2000b).
     Anti-dumping system has been able to sustain and grow in practice due to public perception of "dumping" which is different from the rules and regulations and its relevance as a safety valve, political expediency due to impact of liberal­ization and globalization, lobbying by pressure groups and differences in competition standards among nations (Thara-kan,  1999). Anti-dumping actions have implications for foreign investment flows. There seems to be a coincidence between anti-dumping cases and inward investment. The evidence from the EU and the US shows that anti-dumping actions have substantially increased the incidence of man­ufacturing investment by Japanese firms in these regions. What it means is that imports are being replaced by local production by foreign firms which can still practice price dis­crimination or sales below full production cost. But, at the same time, anti-dumping actions lead to large welfare losses. Anti-dumping duties can also have negative impact on ex­port competitiveness of an industry if duties are imposed on products that go as inputs into that industry (Bhat, 2003).
     There are many problematic aspects of the Agreement. The definition of dumping favors the party imposing anti-